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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**
THE MEANING OF "ORDINARY
COURSE OF BUSINESS" UNDER
THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE-VERTICAL AND
HORIZONTAL ANALYSIS

It is often necessary for the
bankruptcy courts to determine
whether certain conduct is in the
"ordinary course of business."
This issue may arise in several different contexts. For example, if a
trustee or debtor in possession is
operating the debtor's business
after a bankruptcy petition is filed,
unsecured credit that is entitled to
an administrative expense priority
may be obtained "in the ordinary
course of business'' without the
necessity of first providing notice
and an opportunity to be heard in
court. However, if such credit is
not incurred in the ordinary
course of business, notice and opportunity to be heard must be
provided before the action is taken.1
Similarly, the Code allows a
* Counsel to the law firm of Levin &
Weintraub & Crames, New York City;
member of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
** Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra
University School of Law, Hempstead,
New York; Counsel to the law firm of
Berkman, Henoch, Peterson, Kadin &
Peddy, Garden City, New York; member
of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
' 11 U.S.C. §§ 364(a), 364(b).

trustee or debtor in possession to
continue to operate the debtor's
business after a chapter 11 case is
commenced. The continuation of
the debtor's business requires the
use of assets and may also require
the sale or lease of property as
well as other business transactions. As long as the transaction or
the use, sale, or lease of property
is in the ordinary course of business, Section 363(c)(l) allows the
trustee or debtor in possession to
act without the need for notice
and a hearing. The trustee or
debtor in possesion may also operate the business not in the ordinary course of business but only
after notice and an opportunity to
be heard are afforded. 2
Another application of the "ordinary course of business" concept relates to the recovery of
voidable preferences under Section 547. In general, the preference provisions of the Code are
designed to prevent unusual payments or other transfers on the
eve of bankruptcy which unfairly
benefit, some creditors at the expense of others. Normal prepeti2 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b)(l), 363(c)(l). See
11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2), which prohibits the
use of cash collateral without either consent or prior court authorization even if
the proposed use is in the ordinary course
of business.
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tion payments to creditors should
not be disturbed. For this reason,
Section 547(c)(2) protects against
attack as voidable preferences
certain payments that are made in
the ordinary course of business.
Specifically, a transfer in payment
of an antecedent debt is not a voidable preference to the extent that
it meets the following three requirements: (1) it was in payment
of a debt incurred in the ordinary
course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; (2) payment was made in
the ordinary course of business or
financial affairs of the debtor and
the transferee; and (3) payment
was made according to ordinary
business terms. 3
Although the scope and meaning of the phrase "ordinary course
of business" is crucial in these
contexts, the Bankruptcy Code
fails to provide any definition or
guidelines for identifying an ordinary course transaction. However, a recent decision of the
bankruptcy court in the Southern
District of New York provides a
helpful method of analysis for approaching this issue as it relates to
postpetition activity.
In an adversary proceeding in
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 4 the
bankruptcy court considered the
3 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2); see also Weintraub & Resnick, "Preferential Payment of
Long-Term Debts in the Ordinary Course
of Business-The Effect of the 1984
Amendments," 17 U.C.C. L.J. 263 (1985).
4
60 Bankr. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).

issue whether the debtor's retention of certain lobbyists was in the
ordinary course of business under
Section 363(c)(1). 5 Although the
Bankruptcy Code does not provide a definition of "ordinary
course of business," the court
found that "[n]evertheless a synthesis of existing case law reveals
a developing yet workable analysis to be used in deciding whether
an activity is within the debtor's
'ordinary course of business.' The
analysis, using 'vertical' and
'horizontal' components, embodies the elastic rehabilitation
policies of the Code yet respects
its boundaries."6
The Vertical Dimension

The court in Johns-Manville
explained that the "vertical dimension" focuses on the debtor's
transaction ·'from the vantage
point of a hypothetical creditor
and inquires whether the transaction subjects a creditor to economic risk of a nature different
from those he accepted when he
decided to extend credit. " 7 The
court referred to a district court
opinion in a prior case in the
Southern District of New York,
5
The court also considered the issue of
whether the lobbyists were "professional
persons" within the meaning of 11 U.S.C.
§ 327(a) so as to require prior court approval for their retention. The court held
that the lobbyists were not •'professional
persons" for that purpose.
6 60 Bankr. at 616.
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In re James A. Phillips, Inc., 8 for a holder approval was not entered
description of the vertical dimen- into in the ordinary course of a
sion test (although the court in debtor's business.
Phillips called it the "creditor exThe first area to investigate in
pectation test''):
applying the vertical dimension
The touchstone of "ordinariness" test is the debtor's prepetition
is . . . the interested parties' rea- business practices and conduct.
sonable expectations of what The nature of the debtor's prepetitransactions the debtor in posses- tion conduct may be compared to
sion is likely to enter in the course its postpetition conduct with reof its business. So long as the spect to ordinary course of busitransactions conducted are consis- ness determinations under Sectent with these expectations, credi- tion 363 or 364. For example, in
tors have no right to notice and In re DeLuca Distributing Comhearing because their objections to
pany, 13 the bankruptcy court
such transactions are likely to relate to the bankrupt's chapter 11 found that it was in the ordinary
status, not the particular transac- course of business for the debtor
in possession to bargain for and
tions themselves. 9
enter into a new collective barAnother opinion in which the gaining agreement, in view of the
vertical dimension test was re- fact that the employees were covphrased may be found in In re ered by a collective bargaining
Waterfront Companies, Inc., 10 agreement prior to the comwhere the court articulated the mencement of the reorganization
test as whether the transaction is case.
within the day-to-day business of
The Johns-Manville court emthe debtor ''without some kind of phasized that the primary focus of
separate authorization." 11 The the vertical dimension is on the
Waterfront court noted that debtor's internal operation, be"some transactions either by ginning with prepetition conduct.
their size, nature or both are not However, prepetition activities
within the day-to-day operation of provide only a starting point in
a business and are therefore ex- evaluating postpetition activity.
traordinary. " 12 Applying this test, The court also must consider the
the court held that an indemnity changing circumstances inherent
agreement which required share- in the hypothetical creditor's expectations. "Viewed in this manner, changes between prepetition
and postpetition business activity
s 29 Bankr. 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
/d. at 394.
56 Bankr. 31 (D. Minn. 1985).
1 '/d. at 35.
12Jd.

9

10

13
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alone are not per se evidence of of transaction is in the course of
extraordinariness. " 14 The court that debtor's business or in the
went on to emphasize the impor- course of some other business.' ' 17
tance of allowing a degree of
flexibility to cope with changing Vertical and Horizontal Analysis
Applied to Johns-Manville
business conditions while still acting in the ordinary course of busiBased on this method of analyness:
sis, the court in Johns-Manville
The "ordinary course of business" held that Manville's lobbying acstandard is purposely not defined tivities were clearly in the ordiso narrowly as to deprive a debtor nary course of business. Manville
of the flexibility it needs to run its had engaged in lobbying efforts
business and respond quickly to long before the filing of the chapchanges in the business climate.
ter 11 petition. "Thus, applying
Title II procedures are not meant
to straitjacket a debtor, and a the vertical dimension, based on
debtor must be allowed to marshall Manville's past history of lobbyassets on an "as needed" basis. ing, it is logical to assume that its
The policy behind the Code recog- creditors would reasonably exnizes that the debtor needs a cer- pect Manville to continue to lobby
tain degree of freedom on its road as a business practice." 18 The
to reorganization so that it might court also found that lobbying met
avoid precisely those pitfalls which the requirements of the horizontal
brought it into bankruptcy ini- dimension. "An examination of
tially . 15
other 'Fortune 500' companies
reveals that a substantial number
of
them routinely lobby, maintain
The Horizontal Dimension
offices in Washington, D.C., and
The "horizontal dimension" supplement their in-house staff
applied by the court involves an with outside consultants. " 19
industrywide perspective. "(T]he
The expansive construction of
primary focus of the horizontal "ordinary course of business"
analysis is external-this business applied in Johns-Manville provis-a-vis similar businesses." 16 vides debtors in chapter 11 cases
This method of analysis devel- with appropriate flexibility and
oped more recently than the verti- discretion to exercise reasonable
cal dimension. As stated by the business judgment in continuing
court in Wateifront, the question their usual business practices, and
to be decided is "whether a type
t4

IS
16

11/d.

60 Bankr. at 617.
Id.
/d. at 618.
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to conform to industrywide
norms without the need for prior
notice and the hearing. At the
same time, it satisifes the Code's
policy that only extraordinary
postpetition transactions different
from those that might be reasonably expected to take place
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need be brought to the attention of
creditors and other interested parties to allow the voicing of objections.20

zo See In re James A. Phillips, Inc., 29
Bankr. at 391.
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